Islam And International Legal Subjectivity: A Comparative Conceptual Study in Islamic Literature and International Law

Abstract

The transformation of global order in the twenty-first century has challenged the traditional state-centric structure of international law. Classical doctrine, grounded in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, recognizes primarily states, and to a limited extent international organizations, as subjects of international law. However, the emergence of transnational movements, multinational corporations, global NGOs, and influential individuals has exposed the insufficiency of this narrow conception. Simultaneously, Islamic legal and moral traditions provide a rich framework for understanding responsibility, rights, and agency that centers on the individual as the primary bearer of obligations (taklif). This article offers a comparative conceptual analysis between Islamic jurisprudence and international legal theory regarding the notion of the "subject" of law. Drawing on classical and contemporary scholarship, including Vattel, Grotius, Lauterpacht, Kelsen, Rawls, and Dworkin, as well as ur'anic ethics and the works of al-Shatibi, Fazlur Rahman, and M.A. Draz, the study argues that the individual is the foundational subject of legal responsibility. States and institutions are legal entities with Islamic moral philosophy; the article proposes a reconceptualization of international legal subjectivity that is more inclusive, coherent, and normatively grounded.